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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of child labour on child schooling using the 2002 dataset from the 
Bangladesh National Child Labour Survey (NCLS). The study provides evidence on the sensitivity of 
the results to the methodology adopted and the gender of the child. Working hours have an adverse 
effect on the child’s schooling outcome and the result is robust to the procedure used, but the precise 
nature of the relationship varies between the parametric and non-parametric approaches. While the 
former suggests a U-shaped relationship between working hours and child schooling, there is a 
monotonic and inverse relationship between the two in case of the latter. The study also provides 
evidence that suggests that the gender of the child affects the nature of the relationship, as do the 
parental characteristics, especially parental education. These results attain special policy significance 
in view of the evidence that both parents show a significant preference for educating a female child 
that appears to be at odds with the picture of gender bias in favour of the male child in South Asia 
portrayed in the literature. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Much of the literature concerning the effect of child labour on education concludes that educational 
attainment is likely to be lower for children who combine work and schooling (Ersado 2005, 
Ganglmair 2006, Jensen and Nielsen 1997, Rammohan 2012, Sedlacek et al. 2009).
3
 Following the 
seminal paper by Basu and Van (1998), a number of studies explicitly consider the trade-off between 
child labour and schooling (Basu 1999, Basu and Tzannatos 2003, Edmonds 2007, Emerson and 
Souza 2003, Udry 2006). Heady (2003), however, derives slightly different results for Ghana and 
concludes that child labour does not affect school attendance but substantially interferes with the 
quality of schooling with respect to children’s reading and mathematics ability. Other research 
focusing on school performance arrive at similar conclusions, including Patrinos and Psacharopoulas 
(1995) in Paraguay, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) in Peru, Parikh and Sadoulet (2005) in 
Brazil. By contrast, Ray (2000a), Maitra and Ray (2002) and Ersado (2005) argue that children tend to 
combine school and labour without detrimental effects on their school performance, and it might well 
be the case that their earnings from work make their schooling possible. Most of these analyses are 
based on children’s participation rate rather than hours worked. Exceptions are Akabayashi and 
Psacharopoulos (1999), Boozer and Suri (2001), Rossati and Rossi (2003), Ray and Lancaster (2005), 
Gunnarsson et al. (2006), Han (2008), Goulart and Bedi (2008), Beegle et al. (2009), Kana et al. 
(2010), and Zabaleta (2011). Arguably, child workers who spend longer hours on work activities will 
have little time for school attendance and study and this will hamper their educational progress. 
Exhaustion from longer hours of work could also prevent children from being attentive inside and 
outside the classroom, which has implications for educational performance. Hence, this is an 
important issue, and one that should be addressed by policymakers. 
 
 A factor that holds promise for improving children’s education and reducing child labour is 
parental education. Arguably, if parents care about the human capital attainment of their children, 
higher level of parental education should result in more schooling and less child labour, even in poor 
households.
4
 Though there has been much discussion on the role of parents’ education on child labour 
and child schooling (see, for example, Coulombe 1998, Deb and Rosati 2002, Ganglmair 2006, 
Grootaert 1999, Han 2008, Shafiq 2007), there is a little empirical evidence on their impact on the 
trade-off between child labour hours and child schooling. 
                                                             
3 In this paper, we use the terms ‘child labour’ and ‘child work’ interchangeably. 
4However, it is often posited that more educated parents in poor households without access to credit may face a 
trade-off between education and current consumption; this does not necessarily mean that children of more 
educated parents are more likely to go to school. Indeed, depending on circumstances, caring parents might 
insist on their children working, and use the additional income to improve their children’s nutrition rather than 
increasing expenditure on education. However, another possibility is that even during income shocks (for 
example, unemployment and natural disasters), a household with educated parents is less likely to pull a child 
out of school, or to send a child to work, or both, because educated parents are more likely to have safety nets 
(for example, insurance). 
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 The principal aim of this paper is to investigate whether the number of working hours 
adversely affects schooling outcomes of children in Bangladesh, a low-income country where there is 
still significant use of child labour in many parts of the economy. We also explore how parents’ 
educational levels affect the work-schooling trade-off between genders. As regards Bangladesh, only 
a limited number of studies have investigated the trade-off between child labour and schooling (Amin 
et al. 2006, Arends-Kuenning and Amin 2004, Ravallion and Wodon 2000, Shafiq 2007). However, 
Khanam (2008) finds that children tend to combine schooling with work. Apart from these studies, 
there has been a quite different strand of literature, which documents the link between child labour 
and household participation in group-based credit programs (Islam and Choe 2011, Ridao-Cano 
2001). There is one consistent finding from these papers: household access to credit has not 
significantly reduced child labour in Bangladesh. In the case of child schooling, the evidence is 
mixed. However, none of these studies investigate whether parental education levels affect the work-
schooling trade-off. 
 
In this paper, we make the following contributions beyond these studies. First, we use an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy because the number of hours that a child works is 
endogenously chosen. This is similar to the most recent literature on developing countries (Beegle et 
al. 2009, Boozer and Suri 2001, Goulart and Bedi 2008, Gunnarsson et al. 2006) which uses an IV 
strategy to identify the effect of child labour. We also use a non-parametric approach for further 
investigation of the relationship between child labour hours and schooling. Second, we explore the 
selectivity biases that emerge in child labour studies. Hours of work are only available for working 
children; children who work different hours might have unobserved characteristics that could be 
correlated with the unobservables in the outcome equation (in this case, school), causing our estimates 
to be biased and inconsistent. However, this estimation bias has received very little attention in most 
studies that estimate the effect of the number of working hours on child schooling outcomes 
(Ravallion and Wodon 2000, Ray and Lancaster 2005). Finally, the empirical analysis is carried out 
by utilising the Bangladesh National Child Labour Survey data for 2002-2003. This dataset has not 
been used in the previous literature to investigate the trade-off between child labour hours and child 
schooling in Bangladesh. 
We find that the working hours adversely affect child schooling from the very first hour of 
work, but the marginal impact of child labour hours weakens when working hours increase. However, 
a non-parametric approach suggests that hours worked by children decrease their schooling. We also 
find that parents’ education shifts the work-schooling trade-off in favour of education; the mother’s 
educational attainment has stronger marginal effects on the work-schooling trade-off than the father’s 
education. We note that the mother’s and father’s education (as measured by the highest grade 
attained) shows a significant preference for educating a female child. The same incentive effect is not 
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found for a male child, which suggests that male children are more likely to work. Finally, a sample 
consisting of only working children introduces a significant bias of IV estimates of the work-
schooling trade-off. 
 
2.  Features of child labour in Bangladesh 
 
In spite of legislation, children are relatively less protected in Bangladesh. As regards Bangladesh, a 
National Child Labour Survey (henceforth NCLS) conducted in 2002-2003 by the Bangladesh Bureau 
of Statistics (BBS), found that approximately 5 million (14%) of the total 35 million children between 
the ages of 5 and 14 were economically active. Of this total 3.5 million (71%) were boys and 1.5 
million (29%) were girls. Official statistics have shown that the total working population between the 
ages of 5 and 17 was approximately 7.9 million, of which 5.8 million (73%) were boys and 3.1 
million (27%) were girls (NCLS 2002). 
 
 The widespread prevalence of child labour in Bangladesh, despite the government’s programs 
and laws prohibiting work by children, suggests that additional policy measures to curb child labour 
are warranted. At present, there are 25 special laws and ordinances to protect and improve the status 
of children in Bangladesh (Khanam 2006). It is widely believed that there is a lack of harmony among 
laws that uniformly prohibit the employment of children or set a minimum age for employment. 
Under the current law, the legal minimum age for employment varies, between 12 and 16, depending 
on the sector (Khanam 2006). However, Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority (BEPZA) 
has restricted the minimum age to 14 for employment in EPZs. 
 
In 1995, Bangladesh signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which had been 
undertaken by the ILO and UNICEF to eliminate child labour from the garments industry. As reported 
by Rahman et al. (1999), this approach neither reduced child labour among these children nor 
increased their schooling. A second MOU was undertaken by the same parties in 2000 to reaffirm the 
agreements of the first MOU and to develop a long-term and sustainable response to monitoring child 
labour in the garments industry (Khanam 2006). Furthermore, since 1993, primary school education 
has become compulsory in Bangladesh, and the country has adopted school subsidy provision to 
improve schooling and thereby attract and retain children. However, previous literature has shown 
that participation in the child labour force may not be responsive to education-related policy measures 
(see, for example, Ravallion and Wodon 2000). Another educational incentive program that 
encouraged girls to increase their (junior) secondary schooling (i.e. Grade 6-10) was found to be 
effective in increasing secondary school attendance (see Arends-Kuenning and Amin 2004). 
However, no research thus far attempts to shed light on whether this particular subsidy reduces 
participation in child labour. 
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3.   Data and variables 
 
3.1. Data 
 
The empirical analysis of this paper is based upon the individual-level data for 2002-2003 National 
Child Labour Survey (henceforth NCLS). This survey has been designed in the context of the 
commitments made by the Government of Bangladesh, following the ratification of the ILO Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182) 1999. The NCLS 2002 was designed to provide reliable 
estimates of child labour at national, urban and rural levels, as well as by districts. The NCLS 
included a child population between the ages of 5 and 17 from 40,000 households. However, NCLS 
excluded children living in the streets or in institutions such as prisons, orphanages or welfare centres.  
The NCLS considers a child (aged 5-17) to be employed if he or she worked at least one hour 
during the reference week (the week preceding the day of the survey). However, the survey does not 
consider child participation in domestic work to be labour. To enable our empirical analysis, we focus 
on children between the ages of 5 and 17 who worked at least one hour during the reference week as a 
paid (wage) employee (paid in cash or in kind), or who was self-employed,
5
 or who worked as an 
unpaid employee (for example, work on the family farm or in family businesses) related to the 
household head.
6
 This is especially important as globally only a relatively small fraction of children 
work for wages. Furthermore, we follow the definition of work similar to the NCLS, that is, we 
exclude domestic work. For the estimation of child labour, five years may be considered extreme 
because this is the cut-off age between infancy and childhood. However, it is not unusual in case of 
Bangladesh, particularly in rural areas. On the other hand, although the official enrolment age in 
Bangladesh is six years, there are some children who start school at the age of five (and therefore, the 
start of the potential trade-off between schooling and child labour). We extend the age limit to 17 
years in order to capture a better interaction between child labour and education. According to the 
education system in Bangladesh, students at the age of 17 should be at the beginning of higher 
secondary school. However, the data suggests that there are some children in the age group of 5-17 
who are still in primary school. This is very common, especially in rural areas. 
The analysis is performed upon a full sample of 14,062, 5-17 year old children drawn from 
the survey’s urban and rural respondents. In this sample, 9,404 (67%) are male children and 4,658 
(33%) are female children. Out of this sample, 2,801 males and 1,439 females reside in urban areas, 
while 6,603 males and 3,219 females reside in rural areas. 8,900 children are actively participating in 
                                                             
5 A self-employed or own-account worker is officially defined as a person who works for his or her own farm or 
non-farm enterprise for profit or family gain. 
6 NCLS classified children as sons and daughters if they are the son or daughter of the head of the household or 
spouse. The father is called the head of the household if the head is identified as male and the mother is called 
the spouse (if listed as the opposite sex), and the mother is called the head if the head is identified as female and 
the father is called the spouse (if listed as the opposite sex). 
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the labour force, consisting of 6,750 males and 2,150 females. Of the children who are working, 2,508 
reside in urban areas and 6,392 reside in rural areas. Approximately, 76% of both the urban and rural 
samples are male.  
3.2. Variables 
 
Human capital accumulation is measured by two alternative variables: school attendance and grade-
for-age (GAGE). However, it is often posited that a more accurate assessment of the impact of child 
labour on human capital development should focus on measures of learning outcomes, such as test 
scores, rather than school enrolment or attendance. We depart from this practice for two main reasons: 
a) test scores are not available for children in the dataset considered here, and b) the test scores which 
measure the reading, language and mathematical skills do not always provide a complete picture of 
learning achievements. This is especially true in a developing country such as Bangladesh where 
enrolling all school-aged children in school is still a major development challenge. In this survey, 
each child was asked whether he or she is attending school (full-time or part-time) at the time of the 
survey. GAGE is defined as follows (Psacharopoulos and Yang 1991): 
    GAGE =  G/ A − E  ∗ 100 
where G is the highest grade of formal schooling attained by a child, A is the child’s age, E is the entry 
age to school. All those with a score under 100 are considered to be below normal progress in the 
school system because of grade repetition or late enrolment.
7,8
 The formula for GAGE presented 
above highlights several issues when using data on very young children. For children who are in their 
first year of schooling, a strict interpretation of GAGE will give an infinite value since the 
denominator is zero (i.e. A–E = 0). Furthermore, if a child starts school before the official school 
entry age (i.e. six years), then GAGE could potentially be greater than 100. Therefore, for GAGE 
specifications, we confine our sample to children between the ages of 7 and 17. 
The explanatory variable of main interest is weekly hours of work carried out by a child in the 
reference week during which a child was employed. Table 1 presents definitions and descriptive 
statistics of other potential explanatory variables used in the analysis by child work status (i.e. 
working and non-working children). Child-specific characteristics include the child’s age, and 
                                                             
7Usually, GAGE is a real number between 0 and 100, where GAGE = 100 means that the individual has a good 
performance, and he or she has not repeated any year or dropped out of school. However, in a few cases, it could 
be the case that GAGE>100 because some children might start their education at an earlier age than the entry 
age. If GAGE is low (close to zero), this is a sign that this child has stopped studying for some years or has had 
a low performance. It is desirable that GAGE be close to 100. 
8Ray and Lancaster (2005) employ the ‘schooling for age’ (SAGE) variable that measures schooling attainment 
relative to age. It is given by SAGE = years of schooling/(A-E) x100 where E represents the entry age to school. 
SAGE could not be calculated in this paper because NCLS does not report, ‘years of schooling’ as a continuous 
variable. 
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education. Descriptive statistics conditional on work status suggest that working children are on 
average older and generally combine school with work more than their non-working counterpart. This 
difference is generally statistically significant at conventional levels.
9
 In addition, a child gender 
dummy is included to capture the gender disparities in education and work that may arise due to 
differences in parental preferences. Moreover, the statistics indicate that there is a negative 
relationship between the labour supply and female children. It may be surmised that the demand for 
female child labour is high at home. At the household level, household compositions and household 
assets are included. Household compositions include a number of adult males and females aged over 
17 years, which may reduce pressures upon the individual child. There is a difference between 
working and non-working children with respect to the number of adult males and females, and this 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Since children must often care for their younger 
siblings, the number of younger children aged 0-4 is also included. It is evident from these statistics 
that children who supply labour tend to come from families with a smaller land holding and higher 
number of school-aged children. The difference between a working and a non-working child is 
generally statistically significant. We also included a set of parental characteristics that may influence 
parental decisions with regard to child labour. The statistics suggest that an improvement in parents’ 
education will reduce child labour supply. This has important policy implications. However, there is 
little difference between working and non-working children in the effect of the father’s education, but 
the difference is never statistically significant. 
The remaining measure includes a set of community variables that may influence the demand 
for child labour. Hence, location (urban or rural areas) of the household is included as a regressor. The 
descriptive statistics suggest that the rate of incidence of child labour varies by urban and rural areas. 
Besides location, a policy measure to reduce child labour is an improvement in school quality. While 
we do not have any clear information about student achievement, we explore the effect of school input 
by including a set of dummy variables that capture the quality of school. These are the formal schools 
administered by the government, and the NGO schools run by non-government organisations. On 
average, approximately 59% of children who work go to a formal school, while the corresponding 
number for non-working children is approximately 21%. This difference is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
Table 2 presents time allocation of children to schooling, work, or both, by urban and rural 
areas and by gender. A significant proportion of children simultaneously undertake both schooling 
and work activities. Interestingly, however, the proportion of children who only work is higher than 
that of those who both work and go to school. This finding differs from the findings of Shafiq 
(2007),who, using the HIES (Household Income and Expenditure Survey) 2000 from Bangladesh, 
                                                             
9 We computed this result using a standard t-test. 
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found that children mostly attend school only whereas the proportion of children who both attend 
school and also work is relatively small. Rural children are more likely to work and go to school at the 
same time than are their urban counterparts. However, urban children are more likely to become idle 
(i.e. reportedly involved neither in schooling nor in child labour). The higher proportion of idle 
children in urban areas indicates that a household may pull children out of school before completion. 
However, the findings about idle children may be under-reported because NCLS 2002 does not 
consider domestic work as child labour or because households are hesitant to report child labour 
practices to survey collectors. With respect to gender, more female than male children attend school 
full-time (i.e. those attend school and avoid child labour), and fewer females than male children are 
employed full-time and combine work with schooling. 
Table 3 presents the incidence of child labour force participation and school attendance for 
children between the ages of 5 and 17. In all areas, the child participation rate in the labour market 
increases with age, though not monotonically. Ray (2000a, 2002) also provides similar evidence from 
Nepal, Peru and Pakistan. In the case of child schooling, the attendance rate peaks around 12 years in 
urban and rural areas, and then falls. The gender picture is similar in both urban and rural areas with 
respect to child labour, with males registering a higher participation than females. This finding is 
consistent with Ray (2000b), who provides similar evidence from India. However, the situation differs 
sharply with respect to child schooling with a more even gender imbalance in the attendance rate 
between male and female children in the later age groups of 12-17 years. This observation is also 
borne out by Ray (2000a), who finds that Pakistani girls’ schooling falls to nearly half that of boys in 
the age groups of 14-17 years. In the context of Bangladesh, there are several possible reasons for this 
drop-off. Girls are separated away from male contact at an early age (based on religion). Since there 
are few primary schools, and even fewer secondary schools reserved for girls, young females have to 
leave school on reaching adolescence. Another possible explanation is that it is customary for girls to 
marry early, which tend to further curtail schooling. Additionally, female children are often asked to 
do domestic chores, which further discourage educational advancement. 
 Interestingly, the school attendance rates of rural children in almost all age groups are 
consistently larger than their urban counterparts, with the former registering figures approximately 
60% for males and 50% for females around 12 years and falls off sharply beyond 14 years. In the case 
of urban areas, the attendance rate rarely goes above 50% and falls off sharply beyond 14 years.  
Table 4 shows the employment status of children by urban and rural areas and by gender. In 
rural areas 52% of working males were unpaid employees and 40% were paid employees. In urban 
areas, however, approximately 48% of working males were paid workers and 43% were unpaid 
workers (work without pay in family farms or in the family business). Similar patterns are not found 
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for female working children. A large proportion of female child workers worked without pay in 
family farms or in the family business, and this is relatively high in rural areas.  
 These patterns suggest that opportunities for child workers are quite different in rural and 
urban areas. In rural areas, children are more likely to engage in agricultural activities and become 
unpaid workers, especially female children. In urban areas, children are more likely to find 
opportunities for some paid work. The gender difference in employment status among child workers 
is also significant in Bangladesh. Young females are more likely than young males to be unpaid 
workers in both urban and rural areas. This may imply that male children are increasingly entering the 
formal wage labour market rather than working as unpaid workers, and thus allowing female children 
to substitute into the unpaid activities. 
Figure 1 shows that there appears to be a threshold beyond which the number of hours 
worked is strongly associated with reduced school attendance in Bangladesh. The number of working 
hours appears to have a relatively small impact on school attendance up to the 15-29 hours cohort, but 
attendance falls off dramatically when children work more than 29 hours per week. The decline is 
more gradual for girls than for boys, perhaps because some kinds of chores and subsistence work are 
more compatible with school. 
 
4.  Analytical framework and empirical strategy 
 
In this paper, we assume that parental preferences may not be conjugal and that differences may exist 
in parental preferences regarding child’s work and schooling. This is consistent with the literature that 
suggests that male and female heads of the household may have different utilities, reservation utilities, 
and budget constraints and that they therefore may make different decisions (see, for example, 
McElroy and Horney 1981). The resolution of the preference difference of the male and female 
household heads may depend on the relative bargaining power of each individual, and this power may 
depend on (a) control over assets, both current and those brought into marriage; (b) unearned income 
or transfer payments and welfare receipts; (c) access to social and interpersonal networks; and (d) 
attitudinal attributes. In the absence of direct information on parental preferences, as well as the non-
labour income of each spouse, we shall, in this paper, consider the different role of the mother’s and 
father’s education (Basu 2006, Basu and Ray 2001). We propose that women’s education increases 
women’s bargaining power in household decisions and if the mother obtains a higher marginal 
disutility from child labour than the father, an increase in the bargaining power of a mother will 
reduce child labour and increase child schooling. 
 
In this framework, let us assume that a household is comprised of a mother and father and 
some number of children. Fertility is assumed to be exogenous. In general, each parent is considered 
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altruistic in that they care about the consumption of each member of the household and the quality 
(educational attainment) of their children. All decisions are made by altruistic parents, and children 
are treated as recipients of parents’ decisions.10 The parents allocate the child’s total endowment of 
time between school attendance and work. Leisure is not included in this analysis for simplification. 
Household income must meet the cost of household consumption and schooling. Household income is 
generated by a typical household production function with decreasing returns. We assume it is a 
function of the parent’s non-labour income, the parent’s labour income and the child’s income. We 
shall maintain the strong assumption that non-labour income is exogenous, and we therefore ignore 
the fact that current non-labour income probably reflects past labour supply decisions. While primary 
education is almost free in Bangladesh, schooling costs can be significant in terms of costs on 
transportation, school uniform, utensils and so on, especially for the poor. Parental investment for a 
given level of schooling would depend on a vector of child, parental, household and communal 
characteristics. Child labour supply equals child’s total endowment of time less school attendance and 
depends on a vector of child, parental, household and communal characteristics. 
This simplified framework forms the basis of our empirical analysis, which is discussed 
below. 
 
Let 𝑆𝑖
∗
 denote the latent variable that describes household decisions to enrol a child 𝑖 in 
school. The equation for 𝑆𝑖
∗
is written as follows: 
𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑖
2 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑚 + 𝛼5 𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑚 + 𝛼6𝐸𝑓 + 𝛼7 𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑓 + 𝛼8𝑍 + 𝜇𝑖    (1) 
 
 
where 𝐿𝑖  represents a child 𝑖’s  𝑖 = 1, . . . . , K  weekly working hours in the reference week and its 
quadratic term 𝐿𝑖
2  captures the non-linear effects of hours worked,
11
 𝐺𝑖  is the dummy for a female 
child. 𝐸𝑚  and 𝐸𝑓  denote the mother’s and father’s education measured by the highest grade attained.
12
 
Emerson and Souza (2007) conclude that the mother’s and father’s education may affect investments 
in the male and female children differently. The gender of the sampled child is, therefore, interacted 
with each parent’s education 𝐸𝑗 (𝑗 = mother or father). 𝑍  is a vector of exogenous child, household 
and community characteristics that determine 𝑆𝑖
∗
and 𝜇𝑖  is the random factor. 
 
In practice, however, we do not observe 𝑆𝑖
∗
. For school attendance, one could observe the 
following binary measures: 
                                                             
10 In line with the literature, it is assumed that children do not bargain with their parents because they do not 
have a valid fallback option (Bhalotra 2007). 
11 Ray and Lancaster (2005) and Han (2008) also employed the quadratic term of the number of working hours 
in their study of child labour and schooling. 
12Ravallion and Wodon’s (2000) study on child labour and child schooling in Bangladesh also used binary 
variables to indicate level of education completed by the mother and the father. 
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𝑆𝑖 =  
1       𝑖𝑓  𝑆𝑖
∗ > 0                   
0       𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖
∗ = 0                  
  
Alternatively, for GAGE: 
𝑆𝑖 =  
GAGE 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖
∗ > 0                       
0        𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖
∗ = 0                       
  
Thus, the estimating equation is: 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑖
2 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑚 + 𝛼5 𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑚 + 𝛼6𝐸𝑓 + 𝛼7 𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑓 + 𝛼8𝑍 + 𝜇𝑖   (2) 
 
 
While we estimate Equation (2) by probit if the variable of interest is school attendance, we 
use the tobit model if the variable of interest is GAGE because GAGE has observed zero values for 
approximately 46% of children aged 7-17. 
One potential concern of estimating Equation (2) is that child labour hours and child labour 
hours (squared) may not be exogenous. Specifically, certain unobserved factors that determine school 
attainment may also explain hours worked, causing our probit or tobit model estimates to be biased 
and inconsistent.
13
 To avoid this endogeneity problem, we use a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) 
strategy. There is, however, one other problem. Note that household income included in variable 𝑍 is 
most likely to be endogenous because whether or not children work is likely to influence parents’ 
reservation wages and their labour market participation (Wahba 2006). To avoid endogeneity of this 
variable, we include an occupation status of the father to proxy wealth.
14
 
 Thus, the reduced-form work equation is written as follows: 
𝐿𝑖 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑍 + +𝛽3𝑉𝑖+𝛽4𝐸𝑚 + 𝛽5(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑚 ) + 𝛽6𝐸𝑓 + 𝛽7(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑓) + 𝜈𝑖   (3) 
 
where 𝑉𝑖  is the instrumental variable and 𝜈𝑖  is the random factor. Instruments are described and 
justified in the following section. 
The instrumental variable (IV) procedure can be described as follows. In the first stage, we 
estimate Equation (3) by ordinary least squares (OLS) and obtain the residual (𝜐). We follow the same 
procedure when the child labour hour (squared) is the dependent variable. In the second stage, we 
include predicted residuals from first-stage regressions into Equation (2) as additional regressors. The 
                                                             
13The unobserved determinants could be person-specific or individual attributes, such as ‘motivation’ or 
‘energy’ that might drive certain children to both work more and study more. 
14We assume that the contribution of children’s income to overall household income is not large. In doing so, we 
have abstracted from another significant endogeneity problem. 
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significant coefficients on residuals imply that the null hypothesis of exogeneity of child labour hours 
is rejected. Equation (2) can now be written as follows: 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑖
2 + 𝛼3𝜐 𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼4𝜐 𝐿𝑖2 + 𝛼5𝐺𝑖+𝛼6𝐸𝑚 + 𝛼7(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑚 ) + 𝛼8𝐸𝑓 + 𝛼9(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑓) +
𝛼10𝑍+𝜇𝑖               (4) 
 
where 𝜐 𝐿𝑖  and 𝜐 𝐿𝑖
2 are predicted residuals from the OLS estimates of child labour hours and child 
labour hours (squared) equations, respectively. 
 
4.  Results and discussion 
 
The potential endogeneity of the number of working hours is verified through a Hausman test. The 
chi-square test rejects the joint exogeneity of hours worked and its square term in almost all 
specifications that we estimated (see Tables 5 and 6, bottom). To solve the endogeneity problem, we 
relied on instruments such as a set of industry dummies (agriculture, manufacturing, wholesale and 
retail and service) where the child works. We choose a sector of employment because the amount of 
hours worked that is available for a child depends on the job to which he or she is assigned in a 
particular sector. There is no evidence that the industry dummies considered in this paper have any 
direct impact on schooling. We assume that the only influence that the sector of employment has on 
schooling must come through its effect on the number of hours worked, and not through any other 
channels. According to NCLS 2002, children employed in manufacturing and wholesale and retail 
work approximately 50 hours or more per week compared to other sectors in Bangladesh. In these 
sectors, children may be offered to work more hours, or they may decide to work long hours due to a 
higher likelihood of extra payment. For example, it is well known that in the garments industries in 
Bangladesh children are offered to work more than the minimum number of hours available (i.e. eight 
hours a day), which might partly explain why child labour hours and schooling are not compatible. In 
the case of the agriculture or service sectors, it can be assumed that only a small amount of flexibility 
in working hours is available. The harvest season, for example, is unlikely to be compatible with 
public school schedules. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that jobs in these sectors do not provide time 
that can be used for studying. 
The exogeneity of these instruments is also checked by empirical tests. The relevant test lends 
strong credence to our use of industry dummies as instruments for both ‘child labour hours’ and ‘child 
labour hours (squared)’ equations (with a p-value of 0.000) (see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix, 
bottom).
15
 Over-identification tests are also conducted to evaluate whether the proposed instruments 
                                                             
15 We perform an 𝐹-test that the coefficients on the industry dummies are jointly zero. The F-statistics ranging 
from 137 to 274 depending on different specifications for school attendance, indicating that the instruments add 
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can sensibly be excluded from both ‘school attendance’ and GAGE equations. The Hansen J-statistic 
concludes that all instruments can legitimately be excluded in the estimation of both ‘school 
attendance’ and GAGE equations (Tables 5 and 6, bottom). 
4.1.   School attendance 
 
Table 5 presents the results of school attendance using an IV probit for all children. For ease of 
interpretation the results are presented as marginal effects. Initially, we include individual covariates, 
such as the child’s age, its square term and the dummy variable for a female child, but exclude 
education levels of the mother and the father and other covariates as explanatory variables in the 
regression (Column 1). We find that there is a significant age effect: age is positive and statistically 
significant. This implies that the probability of school attendance increases with the age of the child. 
The square of the age of the child shows that there is a non-linearity in the age effect (the square of 
the age term becomes negative and statistically significant). As the child gets older, the likelihood that 
he or she will drop out of school (due to fail to continue education) and engage in market-oriented 
work increases. This is consistent with findings for various countries reported in the literature; see the 
review of Dar et al. (2002). Being female reduces the chance of being in school. This is a common 
scenario in Bangladesh and in other South Asian countries (Ray 2000a, Rosati and Rossi 2003) where 
there is a significant gender differential in the probability of school attendance and this bias is 
generally in favour of male children. The marginal effects show that being a female child is associated 
with a decrease of approximately 18 percentage points in the probability of school attendance. 
The coefficient estimates for ‘child labour hours’ and ‘child labour hours (squared)’ are 
statistically significant, but are of opposite signs at conventional levels. The negative magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients of the ‘child labour hours’ variable support the proposition that working hours 
adversely affects the probability of the child attending school from the very first hour of work. 
However, the estimated positive coefficients of ‘child labour hours (squared)’ suggest that the adverse 
marginal impact of child labour hours on the schooling variable weakens when working hours 
increase.
16
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
significantly to the prediction of the working hours (see Table A1, bottom). The corresponding F-statistics for 
GAGE specifications varied between 136 and 272 (see Table A2, bottom). Tables A1 and A2 also report the 
adjusted R-squared for school attendance and GAGE regressions, which varied between 0.20 and 0.30. 
16 What this implies is that hours worked by a child has a U-shaped relationship with schooling outcomes. The 
result is consistent with the findings of Ray and Lancaster (2005). We do not have sufficient evidence to explain 
the reasons for this pattern of relationship between child labour hours and school attendance. However, it is 
undeniable that long working hours, beyond a certain threshold level, have a negative effect on children’s 
education. To explore this issue, we include the third and fourth degrees of polynomials in hours and find that 
the relationship between child labour hours and the likelihood of school attendance is not always confined to a 
U-shaped relationship. 
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Next we turn to an analysis of how parents’ education influences the nature of trade-off 
between working hours and school attendance (Column 2). The mother’s level of education (as 
measured by the highest grade attained) shows a greater positive effect on the schooling of male and 
female children but has a differentially higher effect on the female child, as shown by the positive 
coefficient for the interaction of the female dummy with the mother’s level of education. Shafiq 
(2007), using the HIES 2000, found similar results for Bangladesh. This result further corroborates the 
findings that children’s school attainment is linked to the educational attainment of the parent of the 
same sex as the child (see, for example, Emerson and Souza 2007). 
Next we include the father’s level of education (as measured by the highest grade attained) to 
account for the trade-off between child labour and schooling in the effect of both the mother’s and 
father’s level of education (Column 3). Altogether, the results suggest that the father’s education has a 
greater positive impact on his daughter’s school attendance than on a son’s. This is indicated by the 
interaction of the female dummy with the father’s education and, hence, shifts the trade-off towards a 
daughter’s schooling. This is not a new result in the context of Bangladesh. Using the HIES 2000 
Shafiq (2007) finds that a female child has a seven percentage point higher probability of being 
enrolled in school by having an educated father. One possible explanation is that father’s education 
may be more important because fathers are often more educated than mothers in developing countries. 
Alternatively, it may be that fathers play a more active role in certain kinds of decisions. On the other 
hand, though the effect of the mother’s level of education increases the probability of school 
attendance for all children; the preference for educating a female child virtually disappeared when 
controlled with the father’s education. We verify the robustness of these results by including 
additional covariates, namely household compositions, household assets and community 
characteristics (Column 4). The results are summarised as follows: as far the as the effect of child 
labour hours is concerned, we find a similar association between the number of hours worked and the 
probability of school attendance. The coefficient for a female child is lower but still significant. We 
note that the presence of school children between the ages of 5 and 17 reduces the probability of 
school attendance. This finding corroborates past evidence from Bangladesh (Amin et al. 2006). 
These findings may shed light in favour of the quality-quantity trade-off and the effects of sibling 
competition. Furthermore, it is argued that large numbers of school-aged children demand more 
resources to be put into their education, which in turn forces them to be employed in case of parental 
resource constraints, to make schooling possible for themselves and for their siblings. This may have 
a negative impact on their schooling outcome. On the other hand, there is strong evidence that the 
presence of adult female members in the household increases the probability of child school 
attendance. This effect might reflect the large decision-making power of females among adults in the 
household. As expected, the probability of child school attendance increases in urban areas than in 
rural areas. We also note that the father’s occupation reduces the probability of attending school if the 
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father is involved in agricultural activities (the reference category is non-agricultural activities). There 
are three possible routes whereby a father’s agricultural activities may affect his child’s schooling. 
First, a person working in the agricultural sector may be resource constrained compared to those 
involved in non-agricultural activities and may decide that it is not worthwhile to send his children to 
school at all. Second, agricultural activities in Bangladesh are characterised by seasonal variation, and 
therefore, it is not uncommon for families to engage in non-agricultural activities to supplement 
household income. Involvement in non-agricultural activities by adult members increases the demand 
for child labour in activities where child and adult labour are substitutes. Third, a household whose 
primary livelihood is from agricultural activities may see a lack of relevance in formal education. 
With respect to parents’ education, we find that both the mother’s and father’s education has a 
positive effect on the probability of attending school, though none is statistically significant, possibly 
picking up the wealth effect within the household. The positive and significant coefficient of 
interaction term between the child’s gender and the father’s education might suggest the trade-off 
towards a daughter’s schooling. These results perhaps suggest that parents’ education, particularly the 
father’s education, may not be a good proxy for the permanent income effect and, hence, increases the 
likelihood that a male child will work. 
4.2.   GAGE 
 
Further evidence on the adverse impact of working hours on child schooling is shown in Table 6, 
which presents marginal effects of IV tobit estimates of GAGE (Columns 1-3). These findings are 
supported by Ray and Lancaster (2005) who find similar results measured by SAGE. As expected, 
being a female child is associated with a lower grade attainment.  
We notice that the mother’s level of education (as measured by the highest grade attained) 
shows a positive and significant effect on the grade attainment of her children (Column 2). In 
addition, this effect is stronger for educating a female child. Interestingly, the inclusion of the father’s 
level of education in the model shows that there is no significant change on the coefficients for the 
mother’s level of education, though the magnitude of the coefficient is now smaller (Column 3).17 
Also, the magnitude of the impact of the father’s level of education is significantly smaller than that 
of the mother’s. The father’s education, however, does not reveal any bias towards a female child.  
The final robustness check includes all covariates (Column 4). We again find that being a 
female child is associated with lower grade attainments, but this is no longer statistically significant. 
This perhaps suggests that grade attainments for female children are determined more by institutional 
factors or other issues than by household decisions. Another point is noteworthy. The coefficients for 
                                                             
17 However, these findings must be treated with some caution due to the effect of the ability bias or the effect of 
assortative mating on the intergenerational transmission of schooling.  
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child labour hours suggests that the importance of working hours for grade attainment is much 
weaker, even after controlling for individual, parental and household characteristics. These results 
imply that other factors are more crucial in determining a child’s grade attainment. The results 
regarding parents’ education remain in most cases. 
4.3.    Results from a non-parametric approach 
 
To make our findings more robust, we further examine the relationship between child labour hours 
and schooling with the kernel (weighted) regression approach. The relationship between working 
hours and the probability of school attendance is presented in Figure 2. Figure 3 reports the case of 
GAGE. A closer examination of Figure 2 shows that the probability of attending school declines 
continually with the increase of hours spent at work in economic activities and, hence, provides 
evidence that work and schooling are competing activities. This finding is consistent with Guarcello et 
al. (2006) who find a similar association in four countries (Bolivia, Mali, Cambodia and Senegal) 
between hours worked (spent in domestic chores and economic activity) and not attending school. 
Similarly, we find that grade attainment declines if working hours increase (Figure 3).  
5.   Controlling for sample selection bias 
 
As our estimates refer only to the subsample of children working in economic activity, this could 
generate a selection bias in the estimates. Children who participate may have unobserved 
characteristics that are correlated with the unobservables in the outcome equation (in this case, 
school).
18
 We address this selection bias by using the sample selection model. The selection (first-
stage regression) should be on hours worked, as children working different hours might share 
different characteristics. The selection equation should then be based on a tobit model. However, the 
selection variable would be either 0 for non-workers and positive for the other observations. One 
simple way to estimate the model is to reformulate the tobit model as a probit model, selecting on a 
variable defined as 1 for working children and 0 for non-working children. This is the approach 
followed in this paper.
19
 Hence, the selection equation is: 
  𝐼𝑖 =  
1     𝑖𝑓  𝐿𝑖 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖 > 0                      
0       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                           
     (5) 
where 𝐼𝑖  and 𝐿𝑖  are the latent and observed working hours of child 𝑖 𝑖 = 1, . . . . , K , respectively. We 
observe child work participation as 𝐼𝑖 = 1 if 𝐿𝑖 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖 > 0. The vector 𝑥𝑖  denotes the aggregate 
                                                             
18 Working children, for example, who are in school are often found to have lower test scores than non-working 
children. However, it may be wrong to say that working leads to poor test outcomes, based simply on that 
information. It may be that children with less scholastic aptitude ‘select’ into the state of working, while more 
intellectually capable children remain in school. 
19Theoretically, this approach may sacrifice some efficiency by discarding information on the dependent 
variable. However, this is not necessarily true in a finite sample (Green 1997). 
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form of all the explanatory variables (except for the number of adult males and females over 17 years) 
included in Equation (3) and 𝜈𝑖~𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑁 0,1 . The selection correction term or the inverse Mill’s ratio 
 𝜆  obtained from Equation (5) is included in Equation (6):  
𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑖
2 + 𝛼3𝜐 𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼4𝜐 𝐿𝑖2 + 𝛼5𝐺𝑖+𝛼6𝐸𝑚 + 𝛼7(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑚 ) + 𝛼8𝐸𝑓 + 𝛼9(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑓) +
𝛼10𝑍+𝛼11𝜆𝑖+𝜇𝑖         (6) 
In fact, Equation (6) is equivalent to Equation (4), except for the addition of a selection correction 
term, which is included to adjust for the non-random sample. Equation (6) is estimated by probit if the 
variable of interest is school attendance. This technique is known as the Heckman probit model where 
both the selection equation and the outcome equation are binary choices (Van de Ven and Van Praag 
1981). In the case of GAGE, Equation (6) cannot be estimated by tobit in a sample selection 
framework. In general, the Heckman model assumes that the errors of the participation and schooling 
outcomes equations are correlated and the participation decision dominates the schooling outcomes. 
Dominance implies that observed zero values for GAGE are the result of participation decision only 
and that once the first hurdle (i.e. participation) is passed, censoring is no longer relevant. This 
implies that only individuals with positive values for GAGE are included in the GAGE equation. This 
is typical of Heckman’s generalised sample selection model (Jones 1989). In our case, we simplify the 
Heckman sample selection model by assuming that the participation and schooling outcomes 
equations are independent. In this case, the model reduces a probit for participation (Equation 5) and 
OLS (Equation 6) using the subsample when GAGE is greater than zero.
20
 In this case, both equations 
are estimated separately. 
 
As is well known, the sample selection model requires an exclusion restriction, in the form of 
one or more variables that appear in the participation equation but not in the schooling outcomes’ 
equation. We include the sex of the household head and the number of adults aged over 17 years in 
the household as the exclusion restrictions.  
5.1. How important is the selection effect?  
The results from the second stage of a selection model of school attendance and GAGE are shown in 
Tables 7 and 9. Table 8 presents the probit regression (the selection equation) for the sample of 
children aged 7-17. The signs of the estimated coefficient on the inverse Mill’s ratio are of interest 
here. The results suggest that the exclusion of the non-working children generates the selection bias. 
This is confirmed by a likelihood ratio (LR) test of ρ in four out of five school attendance equations 
(see Table 7, bottom). 
                                                             
20A similar method has been used by Aristei et al. (2008) in the study of alcohol consumption. 
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 We again find that when working hours increase the probability of school attendance 
declines, but at a decreasing rate (Table 7).
21
 The magnitude of the impact of the mother’s education 
(as measured by the highest grade attained) on her children remain positive and statistically 
significant. We also note that the mother’s level of education shows a significant preference for 
educating a female child, but the effect is now less strong. As before, the impact of the mother’s 
education continued to be significant when we included the father’s level of education (as measured 
by the highest grade attained) in the regression. The father’s education still shows a significant 
preference for educating a female child. Finally, the model is estimated with all covariates to ensure 
that the results are not being biased by the potential sample selection. When we compare these results 
with those presented in Table 5, the results are qualitatively similar, however, the magnitude of the 
impact of the father’s education on school attendance of a female child is now smaller.  
Turning to the OLS estimates of grade attainment corrected for sample selection bias (Table 
9), we reveal a similar association between child schooling and child labour hours. However, there are 
several interesting and important differences from IV tobit estimates presented in Table 6. First, the 
mother’s education (as measured by the highest grade attained) does not have any impact on her 
child’s education. However, it now shows a significantly larger impact on educating a female child. 
Second, the impact of the father’s education (as measured by the highest grade attained) becomes 
negative and statistically insignificant when we include the mother’s education. When the model is 
estimated with all covariates the effect of the father’s education becomes positive, but continues to be 
statistically insignificant. Thus, the sample selection correction does lead to substantive differences in 
inference. 
6.   Comparison with a double-hurdle model 
 
In the sample selection model, we estimate the GAGE equation by using only positive observations, 
but this could lead to biased results. To solve this problem, we need to analyse the underlying reasons 
for observed zero values. One potential reason might be that many of the respondents are not 
attending school during the particular survey period (i.e. their highest grade should be zero).We 
therefore consider the possibility of a corner solution. This implies that zero values are the result of 
the participation decision, and the survey respondents may have zero values for GAGE. This reason 
motivates us to use a different approach to estimate the GAGE equation. The approach can be 
analysed by a double-hurdle framework. Thus, in order to observe positive values for GAGE one 
needs to pass two hurdles: the participation hurdle and the schooling outcome hurdle (i.e. GAGE). In 
estimating a double-hurdle model, it is common to assume that error terms from Equations (5) and (6) 
                                                             
21The relationship between hours worked and school attendance is examined further with different degrees of 
polynomials in hours and we find (not shown) that the relationship between child labour hours and school 
attendance is not confined to a U-shaped relationship. 
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are independent (Cragg 1971). The model is essentially then a two-step procedure with a probit for 
probability of participation in the first stage and a truncated normal regression in the second stage. In 
contrast to the sample selection model, a double-hurdle model does not require exclusion restrictions. 
However, a specification issue in double-hurdle models concerns the choice of the regressors to be 
included in the participation and schooling outcome equations. Indeed, Aristei et al. (2008) argued 
that the inclusion of the same set of regressors in each hurdle model makes it difficult to identify the 
parameters of the model correctly, and exclusion restrictions must be imposed. The exclusion 
restrictions are the same as those used in the sample selection model. 
 Generally, we identify substantive differences in the results between the sample selection 
model and a double-hurdle model, as presented in Table 9. First, the relationship between working 
hours and grade attainment is much weaker (the coefficients for working hours are not significant at 
conventional levels) (see Columns 4, 6 and 8). Second, the effect of the mother’s education (as 
measured by the highest grade attained) becomes insignificant when controlled with the father’s 
education (as measured by the highest grade attained); whereas the father’s education now shows a 
positive effect on his child’s grade attainment but continues to be statistically insignificant (Column 
6). However, the effect of the father’s education now becomes statistically significant after controlling 
for individual, household and communal characteristics (Column 8).  
 
7.  Additional robustness checks 
7.1.   Isolating wage employees 
 
In this sub-section, we examine what happens if we restrict ourselves to the sample of wage (paid) 
workers. Paid work involves longer hours than other sorts of work, and virtually rules out school 
attendance. In contrast, other forms of child labour may be more compatible with schooling. We find 
that working hours significantly reduces school attendance but at a decreasing rate (Table 10). On the 
other hand, a different pattern emerges with the tobit regressions for GAGE with the number of hours 
worked, as we now obtain a statistically insignificant effect of working hours on a child’s grade 
attainment (Table 11). When we look at the results for parental characteristics, we find that the effect 
of the mother’s education (as measured by the highest grade attained) continues to be significant with 
and without controlling for the father’s education (as measured by the highest grade attained) in both 
school attendance and GAGE regressions. While the effect of the father’s education is significant in 
GAGE equations, it becomes statistically insignificant in school attendance equations if we take into 
account the mother’s education. Interestingly, the mother’s education does not show any preference 
for educating a female child in all specifications under consideration. While the father’s education 
though shows a strong preference for educating a female child in the school attendance equation, this 
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effect virtually disappears when controlled only with the mother’s education and with all covariates in 
GAGE equations (see Columns 3 and 4 of Table 11). 
 
7.2.    Results by urban and rural areas 
 
There are several points to be noted when looking at urban and rural areas separately (Tables 12 to 
15). Looking first at the results for school attendance (Tables 12 and 13), we find that when working 
hours increase children are less likely to attend school, but at a decreasing rate in both areas. Results 
are reversed with the GAGE specifications (Tables 14 and 15), as the adverse effect of working hours 
on grade attainment is, to some extent, significant only among the rural subsample (see Table 15). 
This may be due to the pattern of activities available to rural children. Turning next to parents’ 
education, we reveal that both the mother’s and father’s education (as measured by the highest grade 
attained) show a positive and significant effect on school attendance and the grade attainment of male 
and female children in rural areas (Tables 13 and 15). The effect of parents’ education, however, is 
weaker for school attendance specifications after controlling for individual, household and communal 
characteristics (see Column 4 of Table 13). A similar effect of parents’ education is not found in 
urban areas. This is especially the case for child’s school attendance. It is important to note that the 
mother’s education does not show any bias towards a female child’s school attendance in both urban 
and rural areas (see Tables 12 and 13) and in the case of the grade attainment, particularly in urban 
areas (Table 14), while for the father’s education, this is true for school attendance in rural areas 
(Table 13) and for the grade attainment in both urban and rural areas (Tables 14 and 15). 
 
8.    Concluding remarks  
 
This paper has investigated the trade-off between child labour hours and child schooling outcomes in 
Bangladesh using the individual-level unit record data from NCLS 2002. We find that working hours 
significantly reduces child schooling. Additionally, a non-parametric analysis shows that the 
relationship between working hours and schooling is not always confined to a U-shaped relationship 
rather there is a monotonic and inverse relationship between the two. 
We also find that parental characteristics, especially their level of education, affect the work-
schooling trade-off across genders. The mother’s education (as measured by the highest grade 
attained) shows a significant preference in investing in female child’s education. A similar impact is 
found for age-adjusted grade attainment. However, the effect of the mother’s education virtually 
disappears after controlling for all covariates. This is especially the case for a child’s school 
attendance. We find that the father’s education (as measured by the highest grade attained) affects 
daughter’s school attendance relative to sons, even after controlling for the mother’s education. The 
interpretation of the results is unchanged when the model is estimated with the full set of covariates. 
The magnitude of the impact of the father’s education is larger in age-adjusted grade attainment and 
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does not show any significant preference for educating a female child with and without the full set of 
covariates. After correcting for potential sources of selection bias, the qualitative results remain for 
school attendance but moderately change for age-adjusted grade attainment equations.  
These results are in most cases very similar when we restrict our analysis to wage employees 
among children or split the sample by urban and rural areas. The most relevant issue is that the trade-
off between working hours and child schooling observed previously still holds, except for tobit 
regressions for GAGE. This is especially the case for wage employees among children and when we 
use the sample of urban child workers aged between 7-17 years. 
These results have strong policy implications. While we find that the mother’s and father’s 
education has a positive impact on schooling of their children, the marginal impact of the mother’s 
education on a child’s schooling is considerably larger, irrespective of gender of a child. These 
findings, therefore, are consistent with our previous proposition that improvement in women’s 
schooling and consequent increases in bargaining power have a greater beneficial impact on children 
compared with increases in men’s schooling. Therefore, policies which improve education levels, 
especially the education levels of women, are more likely to reduce poverty and the incidence of child 
labour.  
One other result is worth noting for its policy implication. Parent’s educational levels are 
more likely to be correlated with the probability that a male child will work rather than go to school. 
Although the Bangladesh government adopts a variety of initiatives to ease the problem of child 
labour, our results strongly suggest that there is a limited relevance of these policies to supplement 
household income, which ultimately results in a higher incidence of child labour, particularly among 
young males. While education-related policy measures appear to be ineffective in the context of 
Bangladesh, we suggest the need for a combination of policies, such as stronger enforcement of 
compulsory schooling for children and an employment generation scheme for adults, to reduce child 
labour. 
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Figure 1: Working hours and school attendance of children  
                 aged 5-17, by gender 
   
    Source: Data are from NCLS 2002. 
 
Figure 2: Kernel (weighted) regression, school attendance 
                             versus working hours (sample 5-17) 
 
    Source: Data are from NCLS 2002. 
 
 Figure 3: Kernel (weighted) regression, GAGE versus  
                  working hours (sample 7-17) 
 
  Source: Data are from NCLS 2002. 
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  Table 1: Descriptive statistics, by child work status    
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Informal school: informal education activities (for example, 
family education and others). Std.  Dev. is standard deviation. t-test for difference (working-non- 
working children).*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
 
 
        Table 2: Male and female children’s activity, by urban and rural areas 
  Urban Rural 
  Males (%) Females (%) Males (%) Females (%) 
Both school and work 20.60 13.34 26.20 16.78 
Work 47.66 28.08 47.07 31.50 
School 2.14 3.47 2.23 2.45 
Idle
a 
29.60 55.11 24.50 49.27 
Total 100 100 100 100 
       Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. aReportedly involved neither in schooling nor in child labour. 
 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. t -test
Child Covariates
Age (years) 8,900 13.62 (2.1687) 5,162 8.3673 (3.8664) 103.12 ***
Female  (1= female) 8,900 0.2416 (0.4281) 5,162 0.4859 (0.4998) -30.64 ***
GAGE (Grade-for-Age) 8,900 12.7334 (13.6052) 5,162 9.1230 (13.8778) 12.01 ***
Currently attending school (1= yes) 8,900 0.3415 (0.4742) 5,162 0.0651 (0.2467) 38.93 ***
Working hours (hour/week) 8,900 28.52 (16.6865)
Household Covariates
Number of children 0-4 8,900 0.4853 (0.7528) 5,162 0.6885 (0.7925) -15.21 ***
Number of school children 5-17 8,900 2.8327 (1.1968) 5,162 2.6025 (1.2295) 10.88 ***
Number of adult males over 17 years 8,900 1.4161 (0.8122) 5,162 1.2420 (0.7258) 12.73 ***
Number of adult females over 17 years 8,900 1.3316 (0.6377) 5,162 1.2454 (0.5942) 7.91 ***
Sex of household head (1= male) 8,900 0.9418 (0.2341) 5,162 0.9380 (0.2412) 0.91
Household has a television (1=yes) 8,900 0.1422 (0.3493) 5,162 0.1197 (0.3247) 3.78 ***
Household has a radio  (1=yes) 8,900 0.2701 (0.4440) 5,162 0.2044 (0.4033) 8.75 ***
Household has a bicycle  (1=yes) 8,900 0.2108 (0.4079) 5,162 0.1523 (0.3593) 8.56 ***
Own marginal land,  less than 0.5 acre 8,900 0.5978 (0.4904) 5,162 0.7088 (0.4543) -13.3 ***
Own small land, between 0.5 and 2 acre 8,900 0.2639 (0.4408) 5,162 0.2121 (0.4089) 6.90 ***
Own large land, greater than 2 acre 8,900 0.1383 (0.3452) 5,162 0.0790 (0.2698) 10.60 ***
Parent's Covariates
Occupation of  father (1= agriculture, 0 = non-agriculture) 8,900 1.4870 (0.4999) 5,162 1.6025 (0.4894) -13.31 ***
Mother's education (highest grade) 8,900 0.2961 (0.7805) 5,162 0.3741 (0.9695) -5.22 ***
Father's education (highest grade) 8,900 0.6090 (1.2116) 5,162 0.6323 (1.3582) -1.05
Community Covariates
Formal school (1= Government school, 0 = informal school) 8,900 0.5917 (0.4915) 5,162 0.2096 (0.4071) 47.23 ***
NGO school (1= Non-Government school, 0 = informal school) 8,900 0.0098 (0.0984) 5,162 0.0037 (0.0606) 4.03 ***
Household uses piped water (1=yes) 8,900 0.0276 (0.1639) 5,162 0.0347 (0.1830) -2.35 **
Residence
Urban (1 = urban, 0 = rural) 8,900 1.7182 (0.4499) 5,162 1.6645 (0.4722) 6.70 ***
Workers Non-workers
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  Table 3: Work participation and attendance rates of children aged 5-17 in urban and rural 
     areas, by gender 
Age School Attendance Work Participation 
  Urban Rural Urban Rural 
  Males 
(%) 
Females 
(%) 
Males 
(%) 
Females 
(%) 
Males 
(%) 
Females 
(%) 
Males 
(%) 
Females 
(%) 
5 0.00 0.81 0.53 1.72 1.03 0.81 1.42 2.41 
6 0.52 1.60 2.85 3.00 2.09 1.60 3.2 4.29 
7 7.84 6.60 5.37 10.95 10.78 3.77 7.32 6.47 
8 10.26 15.71 22.28 13.68 20.51 11.43 30.05 13.68 
9 14.04 22.50 18.66 25.00 42.11 27.50 48.51 29.17 
10 12.03 23.19 17.43 16.23 75.94 30.43 75.00 33.12 
11 22.89 29.03 29.79 8.24 79.52 61.29 77.13 65.88 
12 49.01 41.26 59.08 49.27 91.09 70.63 91.1 82.04 
13 49.82 32.16 54.08 45.79 95.20 89.13 95.62 89.90 
14 38.18 36.31 44.44 32.4 91.74 82.12 93.95 88.27 
15 11.54 12.41 11.48 3.65 90.38 56.93 89.63 64.96 
16 13.24 8.06 13.14 8.06 85.37 64.52 87.74 65.40 
17 15.00 6.49 13.69 9.09 88.33 53.25 87.03 60.00 
Total 22.74 16.82 28.43 19.23 68.26 41.42 73.27 48.28 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. School attendance rate refers to the number of 5-17 years old children   
 attending school expressed as a percentage of total children in this age group. 
 
 
 
     Table 4: The employment status of working children aged 5-17 in urban and rural 
       areas, by gender 
 
Urban  Rural 
  Males (%) Females (%) Males (%) Females (%) 
Paid employee 48.01 27.68 40.24 13.90 
Self-employed 8.58 4.53 7.50 2.51 
Unpaid employee 43.41 67.79 52.25 83.59 
Total 100 100 100 100 
      Source: Data are from NCLS 2002. 
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 Table 5: Marginal effects of IV probit estimates of school attendance (sample 5-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,  
* p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ME ME ME ME
Child's age 0.2010*** 0.1973*** 0.1967*** -0.0367**
(0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0178)
Child's age (squared) -0.0069*** -0.0068*** -0.0069*** 0.0005
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Female -0.1792*** -0.1919*** -0.1994*** -0.1088***
(0.0172) (0.0194) (0.0209) (0.0170)
Child labour hours -0.1202*** -0.1191*** -0.1164*** -0.0812***
(0.0233) (0.0249) (0.0254) (0.0201)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0009***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Residual_child labour hours 0.0829*** 0.0833*** 0.0810*** 0.0592***
(0.0233) (0.0249) (0.0255) (0.0200)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0008***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Number of children 0-4 -0.0022
(0.0062)
Number of school children 5-17 -0.0091**
(0.0040)
Number of adult males over 17 years -0.0059
(0.0058)
Number of adult females over 17 years 0.0198***
(0.0074)
Occupation of father -0.0388***
(0.0112)
Household uses piped water -0.0142
(0.0283)
Household has a television -0.0148
(0.0167)
Household has a radio -0.0034
(0.0102)
Household has a bicycle 0.0427***
(0.0121)
Formal school 0.4825***
(0.0197)
NGO school 0.7196***
(0.0415)
Own marginal land, less than 0.5 acre 0.0121
(0.0150)
Own large land, greater than 2 acre -0.0005
(0.0150)
Urban 0.0295**
(0.0147)
Mother's education (highest grade) 0.0542*** 0.0344** 0.0098
(0.0172) (0.0138) (0.0087)
Mother's education x Female 0.0458** 0.0180 0.0077
(0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0153)
Father's education (highest grade) 0.0280*** 0.0040
(0.0093) (0.0054)
Father's education x Female 0.0288** 0.0232**
(0.0132) (0.0098)
Hausman test of endogeneity: c2(2) 15.55 19.85 20.73 8.95
R>c2 (p = 0.0004) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0114)
Hansen J- statistic (Test of overidentifying 
restrictions)
7.46 7.30 4.41 7.60
(p = 0.2574) (p = 0.2730) (p = 0.1641) (p = 0.0223)
N 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900
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 Table 6: Marginal effects of IV tobit estimates of school attendance (sample 7-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,  
* p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ME ME ME ME
Child's age 5.0780*** 4.3369*** 4.1165*** -4.1712***
(0.5326) (0.5146) (0.5094) (0.2833)
Child's age (squared) -0.1639*** -0.1392*** -0.1335*** 0.1441***
(0.0222) (0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0104)
Female -1.4407*** -1.6351*** -1.5804*** -0.2638
(0.3505) (0.3843) (0.4113) (0.2564)
Child labour hours -0.9718*** -0.7651** -0.6727* -0.2302
(0.3499) (0.3595) (0.3635) (0.2010)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0120*** 0.0091** 0.0079* 0.0026
(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0026)
Residual_child labour hours 0.5256 0.3769 0.3034 0.2359
(0.3508) (0.3604) (0.3643) (0.2014)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) -0.0080* -0.0057 -0.0046 -0.0028
(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0026)
Number of children 0-4 0.0593
(0.0734)
Number of school children 5-17 -0.0955**
(0.0456)
Number of adult males over 17 years 0.1160*
(0.0658)
Number of adult females over 17 years 0.2277***
(0.0841)
Occupation of father 0.0323
(0.1308)
Household uses piped water 0.2161
(0.3432)
Household has a television 0.3391*
(0.1939)
Household has a radio 0.0753
(0.1163)
Household has a bicycle -0.0350
(0.1211)
Formal school 18.2491***
(0.3129)
NGO school -6.0572***
(0.1599)
Own marginal land,  less than 0.5 acre -0.2345
(0.1686)
Own large land, greater than 2 acre 0.0670
(0.1677)
Urban 0.1434
(0.1608)
Mother's education (highest grade) 2.1869*** 1.1236*** 0.2237**
(0.2592) (0.2173) (0.0907)
Mother's education  x Female 0.9931*** 1.2387*** 0.1019*
(0.3255) (0.1485) (0.0569)
Father's education (highest grade) 0.8983** 0.3631**
(0.3622) (0.1695)
Father's education x Female 0.0151 0.1425
(0.2299) (0.1069)
Hausman test of endogeneity: F(2, 8839) 11.70 5.00 3.87 1.17
P>F (P = 0.0000) (P = 0.0000) (P = 0.0000) (P = 0.0000)
Hansen J -statistic (Test of overidentifying 
restrictions): χ2(2)
18.25 13.95 12.31 9.12
P>χ2 (P = 0.1089) (P = 0.9330) (P = 0.2121) (P = 0.1044)
N 8,848 8,848 8,848 8,848
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 Table 7: Heckman probit estimates of school attendance (sample 5-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. ME is marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. In Columns 7-8, the variables included but not reported are  
number of children 0-4, number of school children 5-17, dummies for urban areas, occupation of the father and dwelling characteristics and facilities  
enjoyed by the household, dummies for household ownership of land (for example, own marginal land, less than 0.5 acre; own large land, greater than 2 acre) 
and communal characteristics (for example, presence of formal and NGO schools).*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Child work 
participation
ME Child work 
participation
ME Child work 
participation
ME Child work 
participation
ME
Child's age 1.4084*** 0.2476*** 1.4066*** 0.2463*** 1.4059*** 0.2461*** 1.4057*** -0.0224
(0.0331) (0.0222) (0.0331) (0.0227) (0.0331) (0.0229) (0.0340) (0.0218)
Child's age (squared) -0.0505*** -0.0086*** -0.0504*** -0.0086*** -0.0503*** -0.0087*** -0.0501*** 0.0000
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0008)
Female -0.6154*** -0.1798*** -0.6078*** -0.1919*** -0.6019*** -0.1990*** -0.5924*** -0.1092***
(0.0295) (0.0170) (0.0314) (0.0192) (0.0329) (0.0207) (0.0332) (0.0170)
Child labour hours -0.1200*** -0.1188*** -0.1163*** -0.0811***
(0.0231) (0.0247) (0.0253) (0.0200)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0009***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Residual_child labour hours 0.0832*** 0.0835*** 0.0814*** 0.0591***
(0.0232) (0.0247) (0.0253) (0.0199)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0010 -0.0008***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Mother's education (highest grade) -0.0162 0.0531*** 0.0022 0.0338** 0.0151 0.0097
(0.0220) (0.0171) (0.0274) (0.0136) (0.0285) (0.0086)
Mother's education x Female -0.0279 0.0431** -0.0101 0.0168 -0.0170 0.0077
(0.0376) (0.0188) (0.0456) (0.0199) (0.0462) (0.0153)
Father's education (highest grade) -0.0229 0.0275*** -0.0179 0.0039
(0.0182) (0.0092) (0.0188) (0.0053)
Father's education x Female -0.0170 0.0270** -0.0216 0.0230**
(0.0280) (0.0130) (0.0284) (0.0097)
Constant -8.5328*** -8.5371*** -8.5505*** -8.3104***
(0.1979) (0.1980) (0.1982) (0.2252)
Exclusions restrictions
Sex of household head 0.2702*** 0.2856*** 0.2999*** 0.2768***
(0.0566) (0.0567) (0.0569) (0.0580)
Number of adults over 17 years -0.0397*** -0.0388*** -0.0363*** -0.0441***
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0127)
inverse Mill's ratio 0.3983*** 0.4107*** 0.4103*** 0.1523
(0.0972) (0.1017) (0.1029) (0.1239)
LR test of ρ = 0
p>χ2(1)
N 14,062 8,900 14,062 8,900 14,062 8,900 14,062 8,900
17.49 17.06 16.63 1.61
(p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000)
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 Table 8: Binary probit estimates of child work participation (sample 7-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 p denotes p-value. 
 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Child's age 1.7035*** 1.7060*** 1.7081*** 1.7377***
(0.0462) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0478)
Child's age (squared) -0.0616*** -0.0617*** -0.0618*** -0.0625***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019)
Female -0.6627*** -0.6571*** -0.6525*** -0.6486***
(0.0306) (0.0326) (0.0341) (0.0345)
Number of children 0-4 0.0023
(0.0201)
Number of school children 5-17 0.0194
(0.0126)
Occupation of father -0.1711***
(0.0351)
Household uses piped water 0.1277
(0.0931)
Household has a television 0.0312
(0.0477)
Household has a radio 0.0398
(0.0360)
Household has a bicycle -0.0265
(0.0397)
Formal school -0.1640***
(0.0346)
NGO school 0.0261
(0.1574)
Own marginal land,  less than 0.5 acre -0.0603
(0.0386)
Own large land, greater than 2 acre 0.0362
(0.0537)
Urban 0.0029
(0.0369)
Mother's education (highest grade) -0.0269 0.0036 0.0155
(0.0236) (0.0297) (0.0303)
Mother's education  x Female -0.0213 -0.0115 -0.0133
(0.0395) (0.0481) (0.0483)
Father's education (highest grade) -0.0337* -0.0243
(0.0191) (0.0196)
Father's education x Female -0.0104 -0.0142
(0.0291) (0.0292)
Constant -10.4171*** -10.4389*** -10.4642*** -10.3535***
(0.2858) (0.2862) (0.2865) (0.3120)
Exclusion restrictions
Sex of household head 0.2833*** 0.2929*** 0.3052*** 0.2775***
(0.0578) (0.0581) (0.0583) (0.0593)
Number of adults over 17 years -0.0356*** -0.0351*** -0.0332*** -0.0426***
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0130)
N 11,547 11,547 11,547 11,547
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 Table 9: Selectivity-adjusted and double-hurdle estimates of GAGE (sample 7-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. In Columns 7-8, the variables included but not reported are number of children 0-4, number  
 of school children 5-17, dummies for urban areas, occupation of the father and dwelling characteristics and facilities enjoyed by the household, dummies for  
 household ownership of land (for example, own marginal land, less than 0.5 acre; own large land, greater than 2 acre) and communal characteristics (for example,  
 presence of formal and NGO schools).*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Selectivity-
adjusted
Double-Hurdle Selectivity-
adjusted
Double-Hurdle Selectivity-
adjusted
Double-Hurdle Selectivity-
adjusted
Double-Hurdle
Child's age 15.8681*** -15.4236*** 15.2708*** -15.7261*** 14.9260*** -15.8054*** 10.5176*** -15.0215***
(2.6792) (1.1001) (2.6459) (1.0714) (2.6409) (1.0667) (2.7560) (1.1041)
Child's age (squared) -0.5766*** 0.5464*** -0.5575*** 0.5542*** -0.5456*** 0.5556*** -0.3884*** 0.5198***
(0.0972) (0.0449) (0.0958) (0.0427) (0.0955) (0.0424) (0.0981) (0.0401)
Female -9.9633*** -0.4820 -10.3028*** -1.1342 -10.2306*** -1.3578 -8.4159*** -0.9949
(0.9830) (0.6944) (1.0065) (0.7801) (1.0252) (0.8436) (1.1177) (0.9541)
Child labour hours -1.1476** -1.3851** -0.9612* -1.1436 -0.9286* -1.0946 -0.8882 -0.9108
(0.5172) (0.6796) (0.5367) (0.6983) (0.5463) (0.7098) (0.5804) (0.7444)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0136** 0.0164* 0.0110 0.0131 0.0106 0.0125 0.0105 0.0106
(0.0066) (0.0087) (0.0069) (0.0090) (0.0070) (0.0091) (0.0075) (0.0096)
Residual_child labour hours 1.0305** 1.3001* 0.8823 1.1047 0.8575 1.0651 0.8599 0.9205
(0.5184) (0.6811) (0.5378) (0.6997) (0.5473) (0.7112) (0.5814) (0.7457)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) -0.0130* -0.0163* -0.0107 -0.0134 -0.0104 -0.0129 -0.0107 -0.0114
(0.0066) (0.0087) (0.0069) (0.0090) (0.0070) (0.0091) (0.0075) (0.0096)
Mother's education (highest grade) 0.4819 0.8548* 0.5601* 0.6000 0.6968*** 0.6688**
(0.3736) (0.4750) (0.2992) (0.3724) (0.2610) (0.3165)
Mother's education  x Female 1.0563** 1.7433*** 1.0476** 1.1979** 1.0674** 1.1354**
(0.4430) (0.5287) (0.4796) (0.5658) (0.4893) (0.5752)
Father's education (highest grade) -0.0533 0.3242 0.1343 0.3745*
(0.2129) (0.2638) (0.1653) (0.1987)
Father's education x Female 0.0144 0.5794 0.1257 0.4987
(0.3138) (0.3749) (0.3099) (0.3679)
Constant -113.9558*** 148.6462*** -111.6896*** 147.5952*** -109.2735*** 147.4900*** -55.8434** 153.8724***
(22.8025) (11.1280) (22.4931) (10.7941) (22.4470) (10.8124) (22.7719) (10.1527)
inverse Mill's ratio 140.5323*** 138.7977*** 137.3378*** 108.2542***
(11.8816) (11.7061) (11.6661) (11.5912)
Sigma 11.9150*** 11.7560*** 11.7223*** 11.6247***
(0.1557) (0.1524) (0.1517) (0.1497)
N 5,268 5,268 5,268 5,268 5,268 5,268 5,268 5,268
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Table 10: Marginal effects of IV probit estimates of school attendance for child wage  
   (paid) employee (sample 5-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. In Columns 1-3, the variables  
included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child, in Column  
4, the variables included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child,  
number of children 0-4, number of school children 5-17, number of adult males and females over  
17 years, dummies for urban areas, occupation of the father and dwelling characteristics and facilities  
enjoyed by the household, dummies for household ownership of land (for example, own marginal land,  
less than 0.5 acre; own large land, greater than 2 acre) and communal characteristics (for example,  
presence of formal and NGO schools). *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
 
 
Table 11: Marginal effects of IV tobit estimates of school attendance for child wage 
   (paid) employee (sample 7-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. In Columns 1-3, the variables  
included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child, in Column  
4, the variables included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child,  
number of children 0-4, number of school children 5-17, number of adult males and females over  
17 years, dummies for urban areas, occupation of the father and dwelling characteristics and facilities  
enjoyed by the household, dummies for household ownership of land (for example, own marginal land,  
less than 0.5 acre; own large land, greater than 2 acre) and communal characteristics (for example,  
presence of formal and NGO schools). *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ME ME ME ME
Child labour hours -0.0568*** -0.0568*** -0.0560*** -0.0283***
(0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0074)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0003***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Residual_child labour hours 0.0439** 0.0440** 0.0431** 0.0234***
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0073)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0003***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Mother's education (highest grade) 0.0309** 0.0245* 0.0000
(0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0055)
Mother's education  x Female 0.0195 -0.0293 -0.0121
(0.0295) (0.0338) (0.0141)
Father's education (highest grade) 0.0125 -0.0021
(0.0076) (0.0035)
Father's education x Female 0.0650*** 0.0347***
(0.0234) (0.0104)
N 3,246 3,246 3,246 3,246
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ME ME ME ME
Child labour hours -0.0805 -0.0731 -0.0773 -0.2249
(0.3007) (0.2986) (0.2963) (0.2143)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0021 0.0019 0.0018 0.0027
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0025)
Residual_child labour hours -0.0188 -0.0189 -0.0145 0.2325
(0.3021) (0.3000) (0.2977) (0.2156)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0028
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0025)
Mother's education (highest grade) 1.8027*** 1.1966*** 0.1359
(0.2646) (0.2745) (0.2136)
Mother's education  x Female 0.4543 -0.2976 0.5055
(0.6475) (0.7308) (0.5778)
Father's education (highest grade) 1.0612*** 0.1688
(0.1536) (0.1225)
Father's education x Female -0.2976 0.5055
(0.7308) (0.5778)
N 3,236 3,236 3,236 3,236
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Table 12: Marginal effects of IV probit estimates of school attendance, by urban location 
   (sample 5-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. In Columns 1-3, the variables  
included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child, in Column  
4, the variables included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child,  
number of children 0-4, number of school children 5-17, number of adult males and females over  
17 years, occupation of the father and dwelling characteristics and facilities enjoyed by the household,  
dummies for household ownership of land (for example, own marginal land, less than 0.5 acre; own large 
land, greater than 2 acre) and communal characteristics (for example, presence of formal and NGO schools). 
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
 
 
Table 13: Marginal effects of IV probit estimates of school attendance, by rural location 
   (sample 5-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. In Columns 1-3, the variables  
included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child, in Column  
4, the variables included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child,  
number of children 0-4, number of school children 5-17, number of adult males and females over  
17 years, occupation of the father and dwelling characteristics and facilities enjoyed by the household,  
dummies for household ownership of land (for example, own marginal land, less than 0.5 acre; own large  
land, greater than 2 acre) and communal characteristics (for example, presence of formal and NGO schools). 
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ME ME ME ME
Child labour hours -0.0785*** -0.0796*** -0.0845*** -0.0530**
(0.0268) (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0217)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0009** 0.0006**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Residual_child labour hours 0.0444* 0.0474* 0.0528* 0.0323
(0.0269) (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0216)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) -0.0005 -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Mother's education (highest grade) 0.0722*** 0.0573*** 0.0149
(0.0192) (0.0171) (0.0125)
Mother's education  x Female 0.0025 -0.0368 -0.0303
(0.0250) (0.0317) (0.0248)
Father's education (highest grade) 0.0155 0.0026
(0.0135) (0.0095)
Father's education x Female 0.0500** 0.0437**
(0.0212) (0.0173)
N 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508
Urban Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ME ME ME ME
Child labour hours -0.0804*** -0.0706** -0.0605** -0.0594***
(0.0282) (0.0294) (0.0297) (0.0220)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0008** 0.0007* 0.0006 0.0007**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Residual_child labour hours 0.0411 0.0326 0.0228 0.0366*
(0.0283) (0.0295) (0.0298) (0.0220)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0005*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Mother's education (highest grade) 0.0895*** 0.0555*** 0.0109
(0.0217) (0.0187) (0.0125)
Mother's education  x Female 0.0454* 0.0337 0.0142
(0.0257) (0.0266) (0.0202)
Father's education (highest grade) 0.0543*** 0.0069
(0.0106) (0.0064)
Father's education x Female -0.0008 0.0117
(0.0166) (0.0123)
N 6,392 6,392 6,392 6,392
Rural Sample
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 Table 14: Marginal effects of IV tobit estimates of GAGE, by urban location  
    (sample 7-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. In Columns 1-3, the variables  
included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child, in Column  
4, the variables included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child,  
number of children 0-4, number of school children 5-17, number of adult males and females over  
17 years, occupation of the father and dwelling characteristics and facilities enjoyed by the household,  
dummies for household ownership of land (for example, own marginal land, less than 0.5 acre; own large 
land, greater than 2 acre) and communal characteristics (for example, presence of formal and NGO schools). 
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
 
 
 Table 15: Marginal effects of IV tobit estimates of GAGE, by rural location  
    (sample 7-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. In Columns 1-3, the variables  
included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child, in Column 4,  
the variables included but not reported are child’s age (in years) and its square term, sex of child,  
number of children 0-4, number of school children 5-17, number of adult males and females over  
17 years, occupation of the father and dwelling characteristics and facilities enjoyed by the household,  
dummies for household ownership of land (for example, own marginal land, less than 0.5 acre; own large  
land, greater than 2 acre) and communal characteristics (for example, presence of formal and NGO schools). 
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ME ME ME ME
Child labour hours -0.1492 -0.0448 -0.4198*** 0.2141
(0.4134) (0.4097) (0.0710) (0.3313)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0036*** -0.0032
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0007) (0.0041)
Residual_child labour hours -0.2005 -0.2340 0.1504** -0.2872
(0.4149) (0.4111) (0.0654) (0.3325)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) 0.0020 0.0026 -0.0014** 0.0037
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0006) (0.0042)
Mother's education (highest grade) 2.6152*** 1.8785*** 0.8473***
(0.3024) (0.3000) (0.2167)
Mother's education  x Female -0.0095 0.6437 -0.1858
(0.4120) (0.4567) (0.4134)
Father's education (highest grade) 0.8121*** 0.2479
(0.2116) (0.1541)
Father's education x Female 0.4684 -0.1858
(0.3271) (0.4134)
N 2,497 2,497 2,497 2,497
Urban Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ME ME ME ME
Child labour hours -0.9358** -0.7316* -0.5762 -0.3504
(0.3724) (0.3804) (0.3836) (0.3138)
Child labour hours (squared) 0.0117** 0.0089* 0.0069 0.0042
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0041)
Residual_child labour hours 0.5751 0.4118 0.2692 0.3604
(0.3733) (0.3813) (0.3844) (0.3146)
Residual_child labour hours (squared) -0.0083* -0.0059 -0.0040 -0.0044
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0041)
Mother's education (highest grade) 1.9368*** 0.9654*** 0.3535*
(0.2943) (0.2635) (0.1997)
Mother's education  x Female 1.6773*** 1.5939*** 0.9449***
(0.3960) (0.4289) (0.3585)
Father's education (highest grade) 1.3185*** 0.2077*
(0.1532) (0.1086)
Father's education x Female -0.1100 0.1969
(0.2615) (0.2147)
N 6,351 6,351 6,351 6,351
Rural Sample
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 Appendix 
 
 Table A1: First stage OLS estimates of child labour hours (sample 5-17) 
 
Continued on next page 
Variables Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child's age -4.6797*** -364.2844*** -4.2318*** -335.8697*** -4.1576*** -331.1257*** -2.6349*** -239.3926***
(0.5685) (45.3490) (0.5627) (45.0852) (0.5611) (45.0095) (0.5543) (44.8632)
Child's age (squared) 0.2537*** 18.2197*** 0.2361*** 17.0991*** 0.2337*** 16.9498*** 0.1838*** 13.9708***
(0.0217) (1.7345) (0.0215) (1.7246) (0.0215) (1.7216) (0.0212) (1.7121)
Female -7.8234*** -558.0371*** -8.3044*** -587.3813*** -8.6962*** -612.1867*** -9.1009*** -639.4684***
(0.3671) (29.2830) (0.3869) (30.9968) (0.4037) (32.3822) (0.3951) (31.9826)
Number of children 0-4 0.5522*** 39.4679**
(0.2064) (16.7104)
Number of school children 5-17 0.3561*** 21.5989**
(0.1263) (10.2205)
Number of adult males over 17 years -0.2842 -17.6645
(0.2043) (16.5361)
Number of adult females over 17 years -0.3300 -24.3213
(0.2593) (20.9867)
Occupation of father -1.6757*** -127.0299***
(0.4063) (32.8828)
Household uses piped water 5.2520*** 440.8984***
(0.9445) (76.4504)
Household has a TV -1.9084*** -102.5120***
(0.4732) (38.2988)
Household has a radio 0.0424 -8.8819
(0.3497) (28.3014)
Household has a bicycle -1.9197*** -143.8875***
(0.3819) (30.9097)
Formal school 2.4040*** 149.1312***
(0.3807) (30.8143)
NGO school -0.1983 8.9358
(0.5056) (40.9233)
Own marginal land, less than 0.5 acre -4.7312*** -282.1031***
(0.3285) (26.5927)
Own large land, greater than 2 acre -6.6715*** -498.2775***
(1.5208) (123.0984)
Urban -1.4713*** -149.3000***
(0.3813) (30.8615)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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 Table A1 (continued): First stage OLS estimates of child labour hours (sample 5-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Mother's education (highest grade) -3.1184*** -197.2523*** -1.7419*** -1.8912*** -1.4778*** -98.2428***
(0.2211) (17.7113) (0.3227) (0.2736) (0.2694) (21.8069)
Mother's education x Female 1.5313*** 92.9690** 0.4469 0.5108 0.8163 48.1522
(0.4776) (38.2628) (0.6692) (0.5754) (0.5606) (45.3733)
Father's education (highest grade) -1.4409*** -1.3730*** -0.6711*** -45.9580***
(0.1974) (0.1815) (0.1809) (14.6401)
Father's education x Female 1.1887*** 1.1531*** 1.0188*** 65.1151**
(0.3729) (0.3476) (0.3388) (27.4260)
Agriculture -10.6330*** -712.9078*** -10.4795*** -703.2634*** -10.3606*** -694.7708*** -9.4509*** -630.3137***
(0.8604) (68.6288) (0.8505) (68.1382) (0.8483) (68.0233) (0.8593) (69.5562)
Manufacturing 1.0169 199.9034*** 1.2118 212.0977*** 1.3700 222.6538*** 1.6431* 235.4989***
(0.9168) (73.1279) (0.9064) (72.6169) (0.9044) (72.5158) (0.8818) (71.3771)
Wholesale and Retail -1.8629** -17.7724 -1.3689 13.5565 -1.2142 23.8175 -0.7314 54.8788
(0.8889) (70.9055) (0.8792) (70.4402) (0.8770) (70.3249) (0.8565) (69.3256)
Services -2.3840** -68.2391 -1.9527* -40.6452 -1.8156 -32.0466 -1.3494 -6.4719
(1.1652) (92.9469) (1.1524) (92.3259) (1.1496) (92.1957) (1.1205) (90.6986)
Constant 51.9231*** 3,077.5452*** 49.8776*** 2,947.6196*** 49.6883*** 2,932.3314*** 43.8524*** 2,718.9261***
(3.7588) (299.8323) (3.7178) (297.8616) (3.7076) (297.3305) (3.8030) (307.8235)
F -test on instruments 257.13 244.74 271.15 254.7 256.45 273.69 149.68 137.15
p>F (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000)
Adj. R-squared 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.24
N 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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 Table A2: First stage OLS estimates of child labour hours (sample 7-17) 
 
Continued on next page 
 
 
Variables Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
 Child's age -5.8860*** -444.9689*** -5.1783*** -400.1323*** -5.0317*** -390.8067*** -3.0480*** -269.9108***
(0.7151) (57.1144) (0.7086) (56.8410) (0.7067) (56.7590) (0.6973) (56.5286)
Child's age (squared) 0.2973*** 21.1350*** 0.2703*** 19.4209*** 0.2653*** 19.1054*** 0.1988*** 15.0732***
(0.0268) (2.1423) (0.0266) (2.1322) (0.0265) (2.1290) (0.0261) (2.1165)
Female -7.8539*** -561.0331*** -8.3566*** -591.6035*** -8.7422*** -616.3955*** -9.1892*** -646.1983***
(0.3687) (29.4485) (0.3888) (31.1860) (0.4056) (32.5745) (0.3969) (32.1717)
Number of children 0-4 0.5578*** 39.2850**
(0.2073) (16.8088)
Number of school children 5-17 0.3476*** 21.0636**
(0.1267) (10.2699)
Number of adult males over 17 years -0.2984 -18.6911
(0.2043) (16.5629)
Number of adult females over 17 years -0.3478 -25.4499
(0.2593) (21.0209)
Occupation of father -1.7000*** -129.1848***
(0.4071) (32.9996)
Household uses piped water 5.2083*** 437.4386***
(0.9434) (76.4765)
Household has a television -1.8963*** -101.9894***
(0.4729) (38.3332)
Household has a radio 0.0127 -10.5106
(0.3502) (28.3876)
Household has a bicycle -1.8823*** -140.8615***
(0.3825) (31.0064)
Formal school -4.7858*** -285.2718***
(0.3289) (26.6612)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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 Table A2 (continued): First stage OLS estimates of child labour hours (sample 7-17) 
 
 Notes: Data are from NCLS 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p denotes p-value. 
Variables Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
Child labour 
hours
Child labour 
hours
2
NGO school -6.7112*** -500.8623***
(1.5187) (123.1178)
Own marginal land, less than 0.5 acre 2.4325*** 151.3531***
(0.3811) (30.8972)
Own large land, greater than 2 acre -0.2411 6.2245
(0.5069) (41.0905)
Urban -1.5230*** -153.6383***
(0.3816) (30.9355)
Mother's education (highest grade) -3.1084*** -196.3802*** -1.8727*** -117.5719*** -1.4635*** -97.2046***
(0.2220) (17.8122) (0.2756) (22.1328) (0.2712) (21.9818)
Mother's education x Female 1.5734*** 95.1152** 0.5576 29.7853 0.8737 50.2085
(0.4794) (38.4607) (0.5778) (46.4095) (0.5627) (45.6130)
Father's education (highest grade) -1.3732*** -87.5733*** -0.6663*** -45.7605***
(0.1824) (14.6467) (0.1816) (14.7200)
Father's education x Female 1.1380*** 73.1562*** 1.0129*** 65.7800**
(0.3489) (28.0181) (0.3398) (27.5488)
Agriculture -10.5471*** -703.6908*** -10.3962*** -694.2360*** -10.2658*** -685.9097*** -9.3371*** -619.2119***
(0.8624) (68.8775) (0.8526) (68.3943) (0.8501) (68.2791) (0.8610) (69.8000)
Manufacturing 1.1056 210.0515*** 1.3057 222.5491*** 1.4666 232.8447*** 1.7605** 247.5094***
(0.9187) (73.3763) (0.9084) (72.8743) (0.9061) (72.7728) (0.8834) (71.6150)
Wholesale and Retail -1.7863** -8.5738 -1.2984 22.3474 -1.1330 32.8950 -0.6303 65.6976
(0.8907) (71.1440) (0.8812) (70.6859) (0.8787) (70.5721) (0.8580) (69.5570)
Services -2.3868** -63.3046 -1.9575* -35.8353 -1.8249 -27.4401 -1.3162 0.7437
(1.1669) (93.1979) (1.1542) (92.5885) (1.1511) (92.4507) (1.1217) (90.9281)
Constant 60.0304*** 3,616.7075*** 56.2252*** 3,375.4621*** 55.4972*** 3,329.1966*** 46.7709*** 2,932.4285***
(4.7689) (380.8950) (4.7215) (378.7573) (4.7083) (378.1515) (4.7505) (385.1002)
F -test on instruments 255.28 242.82 269.24 252.72 271.88 254.56 148.69 136.14
p>F (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000) (p = 0.0000)
Adj. R-squared 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.30 0.24
N 8,848 8,848 8,848 8,848 8,848 8,848 8,848 8,848
(1) (2) (3) (4)
